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HOW FAR ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM THE CALL OF 
ECOLOGICAL TAX REFORM? A REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL 
POLICY FOR KENYA 
 
 Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to determine whether ecological tax reform 
paradigm that hitherto is employed by a section of industrialized countries as an 
instrument of environmental management has possibilities of application in developing 
countries. This is an imperative consideration because of possibilities of diffusion, the 
need to approach global environmental issues from a global policy framework and, the 
tendency to global environmental policy convergence. This paper begins by reviewing 
the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of environmental tax in general and ecological 
tax reform in particular. Environmental taxes are particularly difficult to apply due to 
their potential political ramifications. The theory of double dividend that sprung up as a 
solution to this has also run into problems in the process of application as ecological tax 
reform. For empirical analysis, the paper relies on a case study of the environmental 
management policy in Kenya that reveals a strong evidence of global environmental 
policy convergence. Another great revelation is that environmental taxes that are the 
genesis of ecological tax reform already exist in the form of official policy instruments 
and are in actual application. But this does not mean ecological tax reform has freeway 
into the Kenyan policy environment. There are far too many hurdles like over-reliance on 
standards and enforcement, north-south politics, industrialization myth and, the double 
dividend flaw. The conclusion is that ecological tax reform is possible and perhaps 
desirable for a developing country situation but with requisite contextualisation. 
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Ecological tax reform is a fiscal concept or paradigm that is confined to the developed 
world especially the Western and Central European countries.  These countries seek to 
reduce material consumption of natural resources as means of minimizing ecological 
damage to the earth arising from unsustainable resource use.  In this respect, the 
interrogatory portion of the title of this review sets its objective: to find out to what extent 
ecological tax reform could apply to the rest of the world and in particular to developing 
countries, in this case Kenya. 
 
Today, few could disagree with the common say that the world is a global village.  This 
means that although ecological tax reform as a paradigm of environmental taxation took 
root in the developed world particularly the industrialized European countries, the 
currents of diffusion may not spare developing countries.  Pedersen (2005) has discussed 
three factors that can influence the global diffusion of environmental taxes: 
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i) Environmental taxes are based on conventional logic that is of universal 
application. 
ii) International institutions like the UN and its various environmental and 
development agencies. 
iii) The superannuate and bureaucratic nature of existing environmental 
regulation instruments (like command and control). 
 
The question therefore is, if environmental taxes are of general or universal application 
but given also that ecological tax reform is based on a different cultural experience, is it 
applicable in a developing country situation?  Secondly, as Tews et al (2003) have 
pointed out, the international diffusion of ideas, approaches, institutions and instruments 
in the field of environmental protection is responsible for global convergence of 
environmental policies.  This begs the question as to whether developing countries share 
the global objectives of ecological tax reform. Are there prospects for global convergence 
in ecological tax reform? 
 
Thirdly, according to Bluffstone (2003), in developing countries environmental taxes 
only complement administrative rules and standards due to the countries’ weaknesses in 
economic, political and legal structures.  But in the last decade and a half, developing 
countries have been pursuing transformation policies that have seen them embrace 
neoliberal structures of governance that mainly focus on market mechanism as the main 
economic mode of production and consumption.  In reference to the case of the 
transitional economies of Eastern Europe, Welfens (199:945) had noted that “ the switch 
to a market economy creates new environmental problems of its own and also raises the 
question of which type of strategy is adequate for ecologically and environmentally 
sustainable development”.  On this account therefore, we can ask whether ecological tax 
reform is an appropriate answer to the system of market economy.  Kenya is one such 
country that has neoliberalized in the recent past. 
 
This review takes on Kenya as a case study developing country that would provide 
answers to the three queries posed above.  After looking at the conceptual issues 
concerning environmental taxation in general and ecological tax reform in particular, the 
review proceeds into the case study country.  In the latter, it also takes a general look at 
the policy instruments for environmental management followed by a particular look at the 
tax instruments.  Finally the review makes an assessment of the Kenyan possibilities for 
ecological tax reform.  On a balance of prospects and limitations, the review concludes 






A clear distinction can be made between environmental tax and ecological tax reform.  
Environmental tax is also known as green tax or eco-tax and can be defined as any tax 




The conceptual development of environmental taxation began with Pigou who pioneered 
the idea of negative externalities arising from the failure of market mechanism as an 
instrument of resource allocation (Kohlhaas 2000, Pedersen 2005). The externalities in 
this case is the environmental pollution.  Those who cause pollution do not account for 
the cost they impose on society hence an environmental tax is required to meet this cost 
(Kerr 2001). 
 
In spite of Pigou’s reasoning, environmental taxes remained politically tricky.  Levying 
the tax only for revenue purposes raises ethical questions.  In most cases the perception is 
that it is tantamount to legitimizing the social crime of pollution so long as one has the 
ability to pay (Romstad and Folmer 2000).  Binswanger attempted to sort out this 
problem by introducing the concept of “double dividend” in order to make the tax more 
socially and politically acceptable.  Double dividend is discussed in detail in the next 
section of the paper, but the basic argument was that taxation of energy consumption 
could be combined with tax relief on labour resulting into double gains in terms of 
environmental protection and employment creation (Pedersen 2005). 
  
In spite of the social and political acceptability that has dogged environmental taxation, it 
has gained prominence as an instrument of environmental policy especially since 1972 
when the world started thinking seriously about the safety of the environment (Pedersen 
2005).  In 1972, for example, the OECD coined the principle of “polluter pays”.  This is 
also the year of the Stockholm Conference that marked the pursuit of global 
environmental policy and the need to relate environment with development.  This was 
followed up with the establishment of the World Commission on Development in 1983.  
The commission submitted its report—popularly known as the Brundtland Report—in 
1987.  The greatest impact of the report is its definition of sustainable development.  
According to Pedersen (2005) the report had great impact on the political agenda in the 
Scandinavian countries and placed environmental taxes at the forefront of environmental 
policy.  For the rest of the world, this was a situation analysis report that led to the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
 
The Rio conference endorsed sustainable development as a global environmental policy 
and came up with a policy document known as Agenda 21.  Concerning energy use and 
protection of the atmosphere, Agenda 21 calls upon countries of the world to “evaluate 
and, as appropriate, promote cost-effective policies or programmes, including 
administrative, social and economic measures, in order to improve energy efficiency” 
according to their national socio-economic development and environment priorities 
(United Nations 1997:79).  Also of relevance was its focus on unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption and, the development of policies and strategies to encourage 
changes in unsustainable consumption patterns.  In line with this, European countries 




Environmental taxes as applied in Europe are ecologically motivated taxes on energy use 
that intend to reduce CO2 emissions and hence curtail climate change (Tews et al. 2003).  
For that matter, they are also known as energy or carbon taxes.  They are commendable 
because traditional instruments of environmental policy, particularly the use of 
regulations, are inadequate for achieving sustainable development (Welfens 1999).  The 
use of environmental taxes in this case has several advantages.  These include provision 
of incentives for curtailing emissions by cutting on wasteful production or consumption, 
installation of abatement equipment or change of inputs, reduction of output, or invention 
of new technologies for cleaner production (Romstad and Folmer 2000).  Environmental 
taxes also bring the benefit of revenue and in essence their total social costs are lower 
than those of non-revenue raising policy instruments (Kerr 2001).  But the disadvantages 
of environmental taxes owing to its logistic problems are many.  First, since the main aim 
is to discourage a particular activity or behaviour, when the tax is successful in this 
objective, the tax base gets eroded (Romstad and Folmer 2000).  The erosion of the tax 
base therefore undermines the concept of double dividend over time. Although the 
concept of double dividend is discussed in the antecedent section, for the sake of clarity, 
it is necessary to touch on it here. 
 
As we have noted, an environmental tax can change production and consumption patterns 
or lead to substitution of a dirty good for a clean one or promote technological inventions 
that would eliminate pollution by a dirty good. If this is successfully done, it means the 
dirty good would lose relevance as a source of tax revenue. The argument here is that tax 
revenue from a dirty good is required to achieve the second dividend on a revenue-neutral 
swap basis. The more the revenue base is successively eroded, the lesser the amount of 
revenue available to swap for the second dividend hence the smaller the second dividend 
would be. The dwindling of the second dividend therefore undermines the whole idea of 
a double dividend. Theoretically, when an environmental tax successfully discourages the 
use of a dirty good, it means the good is eliminated hence no more revenue. This will 
hallmarks the conceptual flaw of the double dividend. The second dividend needs 
sustainable revenue swap while the first, when virtually achieved, precludes sustainable 
revenue realization. Hence the first dividend cannot practically sustain the second in the 
double dividend theory. The contradiction is that revenue can be sustained only if the tax 
is not completely successful in discouraging a dirty good; in which case the 
environmental tax itself is not an efficient instrument just like the other taxes it is 
intended to correct through the second dividend. Historical examples of virtual success of 
environmental tax in eliminating dirty goods exist. For instance, Romstad and Folmer 
(2000:530-531) have given an illustrious example of how an environmental tax on leaded 
fuel helped to eliminate the dirty good from the Swedish market between 1986 and 1994. 
By 1994, leaded fuel had been completely wiped out of the market and tax revenue from 
it was not available to the Swedish government for whatever purpose the government 
would have contemplated using it. Otherwise the double dividend is based on a perpetual 
balance sheet of private and social costs that do not intend pollution as a phenomenon to 
end but only adjust according to market mechanism. 
 
Secondly, environmental taxes present administrative problems in terms of fixing the tax 
rate.  Due to the erosion effect, the tax rate may not remain constant and this brings 
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problems both to tax payers and tax collectors.  Environmental taxes also lead to 
increased costs to those facing the regulation which instigates strong opposition from the 
target groups.  Raising prices also means that the distributive effect of the taxes may be 
unfavorable to vulnerable groups (Kerr 2001).  The analysis in this section therefore, 
shows that although environmental taxes may be propped by economic ideals, their 
political ramifications always render them controversial and limit the prospects of their 
application. 
 
ECOLOGICAL TAX REFORM 
 
Ecological tax reform on the other hand is a distinct paradigm or concept that refers to a 
particular thinking in the history and philosophy of environmental taxation.  The three 
words that compose the concept gains distinct meaning only when used in this particular 
order with no possibility of substitution.  For instance, saying environmental tax reform 
will have a different meaning all together.  The “reform” component in ecological tax 
reform gives it the distinctive characteristic of purpose.  It implies the introduction of 
environmental taxes that would correct the distortion characteristics of an already 
functional tax system.  Ecological tax reform is therefore a normative concept. 
 
The concept is predicated on the theory of double dividend.  This theory holds that an 
environmental tax is not a revenue-raising tax but rather an economic leverage tax that is 
levied on a “revenue-neutral” basis.  The tax if properly levied will therefore be able to 
achieve two objectives, one which is not primarily intended.  The first dividend or the 
“intended” objective is connected to the purpose of economic leverage, in that the tax 
will be able to achieve environmental conservation; the economic burden of the tax 
would induce a change in the consumption or production behaviour that was detrimental 
to the environment.  The second dividend is the “unintended” revenue that levying of the 
tax would inevitably generate. 
 
Ecological tax reform is more of a policy experience rather than a concept and we know 
it only in the way it has been implemented in certain countries.  In these countries the 
revenue is not seen as a dividend for its own sake.  The argument is that the “revenue-
neutral” policy means that revenues from environmental taxes could be used to cut other 
distortionary taxes and public contributions for the sake of economic improvement 
(Budzinski 2002) hence the term ecological tax reform.  According to Lightfoot and 
Luckin (1999), it means shifting the policy from taxing the “goods” to taxing the “bads”.  
This linkage, as we have noted, was brought in order to make environmental taxes 
acceptable. 
 
 Budzinski (2002) has broken down the second dividend into: 
 
i) Efficiency dividend arising from the use of a less distortionary instrument. 
ii) Employment dividend arising from the swap of environmental tax revenue 
with labour tax revenue causing a fall in labour costs. 




Writers like Budzinski (2002), Kohlhaas (2000) and others have okayed ecological tax 
reform. On the other hand, others maintain that the double dividend approach is 
conceptually flawed (Backhaus 1998).  Whether the double dividend is possible has been 
a question of debate in the European countries where ecological tax reform is being 
implemented (Bayindir-Upmann and Raith 2005). Questions have arisen as to whether 
employment and higher environmental standards do in fact form an inevitable tradeoff 
(Schneider 1997).   
 
It is important to note that controversy is reserved only for the attainment of the second 
dividend and not the first. Whereas consensus exist on the attainment of the first 
dividend, Schöb (1998) has pointed out that the first dividend cannot be taken for granted 
and that a negative impact on the environment is probable from ecological taxes.  Schöb 
presents a two case scenario known as the first-best and second-best worlds. A first-best 
world ecological tax reform involves introducing or increasing environmental tax in a 
non-distorted tax system. Since environmental tax is levied on a revenue-neutral basis 
and the second dividend is not applicable in this situation, the revenue has to be refunded 
to the taxpayers in terms of lump-sum tax rebates. According to Schöb, an increase in 
ecological tax in this case may increase emissions if marginal tax revenues from lump-
sum taxes are negative. 
 
The second-best world ecological tax reform involves introducing or increasing 
environmental tax in a distorted tax system. The revenue-neutral principle is still 
applicable hence the second dividend is desirable. According to Schöb, an ecological tax 
reform that deteriorates the environment is most likely to occur in a second-best world 
involving the double dividend. This is because the tax revenue from a dirty good has to 
be refunded by reducing tax on a clean good.  But if the marginal tax revenue of the clean 
good is relatively low compared to the dirty good, consumption of the clean good will 
reduce at a higher rate than the dirty good. Therefore, comparatively, the marginal rate of 
emissions for the dirty good would be high, and this does not constitute an optional 
economic performance.   
 
Logistically too, the double dividend is not sustainable because the achievement of the 
first dividend may preclude the second.  By successfully attaining environmental 
objectives the environmental tax base gets eroded to the extent that the revenue for 
tradeoff with labour-based or other distortionary taxes are reduced.  This position is also 
true to developing countries where environmental taxes may not raise enough revenue for 
tradeoff with the distortionary taxes.  Therefore, the idea of the double dividend that was 
conceived as the main prop for ecological tax reform is also its main weakness as an 
environmental tax policy. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN KENYA 
 
Environmental management policy for Kenya is mainly spelt out in the Environmental 
Management and Coordination Act of 1999, popularly abbreviated as EMCA.  This 
environmental law is based on three basic principles among others.  These are: the 
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principle of intergenerational and intra-generational equity (sustainable development), 
polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle.  EMCA gives the responsibility of 
overall environmental management to the National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA).  In terms of actual environmental management, EMCA provides for 
the use of four categories of instruments:  regulatory standards, economic incentives, 
international standards and conventions, and lastly, penalties and compensation.  
Economic incentives is discussed in detail in the antecedent section. 
 
National Environmental Standards 
EMCA provides for the establishment of a Standard and Enforcement Review Committee 
(SERC) that deals with water, air and noise pollution standards.  In terms of air quality 
that is pertinent to ecological tax reform, EMCA at Section 78(1) gives the Committee 
indeterminable powers to “do all such things as appear necessary for the monitoring and 
controlling of air pollution” (Republic of Kenya 1999).  This allows it unlimited use of 
command and control measures.  Nevertheless, EMCA also gives it specific 
responsibilities which include making recommendations for follow up by NEMA on: 
ambient air quality standards, emission standards, air pollution control measures among 
other things.  For purposes of application of standards, EMCA provides for other 
instruments like emission licenses for those activities that are likely to pollute the 
environment. A license is issued or cancelled depending on the rate of pollution to the 
environment against established standards.  For purposes of ensuring adherence to 
standards, EMCA (in Part X) also provides for environmental policing through 
appointment of environmental inspectors. 
 
International Conventions 
Part XI of EMCA deals with international treaties, conventions and agreements.  Where 
Kenya is party to any such treaties, conventions or agreements, EMCA empowers the 
National Environmental Council (NEC) to initiate legislative instruments for their 
implementation.  NEC is also charged with the duty of identifying “other appropriate 
measures necessary for the national implementation of such treaty, convention or 
agreement” (Republic of Kenya 1999).  This is a positive point for ecological tax reform; 
supposed there was an international agreement that called for application of economic 
incentives or ecological tax reform as the primary instrument for environmental 
management and Kenya was a signatory then operationalization structures already exist.  
Secondly, where certain environmental standards are adopted for universal application, 
these would be easily implemented in Kenya. One example of application of international 
convention is the policy on the protection of the ozone layer. 
 
Protection of the Ozone Layer 
EMCA gives due recognition to the need to protect the ozone layer as a national goal. It 
gives NEMA the responsibilities of (Republic of Kenya 1999): 
 
i) Elimination of substances that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer 
ii) Controlling of activities and practices likely to lead to the degradation of the 
ozone layer and the stratosphere 
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iii) Reduction and minimization of the risks to human health created by the 
degradation of the ozone layer and the stratosphere 
iv) Formulation of strategies, preparation and evaluation of programmes for 
phasing out ozone depleting substances 
 
This is a promising case of national action against a global problem. It is also a case of 
national policy development that is informed by global environmental awareness. It is 
also a case of global environmental policy convergence. It serves as an indication that 
Kenya as a nation is prepared to abide by international environmental conventions, 
treaties and agreements. This means therefore that if ecological tax reform became a 
global environmental policy instrument, Kenya may  be willing to apply it. 
 
Penalties, Compensation and Restitution 
Part XIII of EMCA deals with penalties for environmental offences.  These apply in the 
contravention of environmental standards where the penalty is a fine of not more than 
Kenya Shillings five hundred thousand or jail term of not more than twelve months upon 
conviction.  For offences relating to pollution a fine of not more than Kenya Shillings 
five hundred thousand is applicable.  In addition to sentencing, the court may oblige the 
polluter to: 
 
i) Pay NEMA the full cost of cleaning up the pollution, or 
ii) Clean up the pollution to the satisfaction of NEMA, and 
iii) Compensate any third parties affected by the incident of pollution 
 
THE FISCAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Economic Incentives 
In the precedent section, we have noted that economic incentives is one of the policy 
instruments that can be employed for purposes of environmental management in Kenya.  
EMCA, at Section 57, empowers the Minister for Finance to introduce tax and other 
fiscal incentives, disincentives or fees to induce or promote the proper management of the 
environment and natural resources or the prevention and abatement of environmental 
degradation.  Such taxes and fiscal incentives or fees may include (Republic of Kenya 
1999): 
i) Customs and excise waiver on imported capital goods which prevent or 
reduce environmental degradation. 
ii) Tax rebates to industries or firms that invest in plants, equipment and 
machinery for pollution control et cetera. 
iii) Tax disincentives to deter bad environmental behaviour that leads to depletion 
of environmental resources or that cause pollution. 
iv) User fees to ensure that those who use environmental resources pay proper 
value for the utilization of such resources. 
 
Environmental taxes fall under the tax disincentives at iii), but other economic 
instruments are also allowed as already listed. In Kenya, environmental taxes have 
already been  tested in the fiscal environment.  For example, there was a tax on emissions 
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charged on imported second hand vehicles.  However this tax was conceived and applied 
in a rudimentary manner. It was based on the simplistic assumption that old vehicles 
pollute the environment thereby necessitating a deterrent tax. The tax was not based on 
any amount of or category of emissions but simply involved just a flat rate levy on 
imported second hand vehicles. The tax has since been withdrawn and replaced with a 




The withdrawal of the emissions tax has left little to talk about the experience of 
environmental taxes in Kenya. Table 1 shows the actual or estimate tax revenues. 
 
Table 1: Central Government Tax Revenue (KSh. Million) 
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Total 109,649.86 106,828.87 111,528.94 132,306.81 133,179.76 
GRAND TOTAL 163,078.79 162,690.82 178,273.22 203,168.81 211,956.56 
 
Source: Reconstructed from Economic Survey 2005 p.104 
 
From the table, we can see that there are no contributions from environmental taxes. 
Labour taxes in the form of income taxes on the other hand are high. Given the double 
dividend concept, the fiscal environment is therefore appropriate for ecological tax 
reform as far as labour taxes are concerned. Labour taxes constitute roughly one third of 
tax revenue. This is a very high tax rate on labour especially for a developing country 
where majority fall outside the income tax bracket.  It means that the few who are earning 
taxable incomes are being overburdened by the tax especially those who are at the lower 
levels of the tax bracket.  The highest tax rate charged in Kenya is 30% of the monthly 
income. 
 
PROSPECTS FOR ECOLOGICAL TAX REFORM 
 
There are three main factors that give good prospects for the implementation of 
ecological tax reform in Kenya.  These include mechanism for implementation of 




As we have noted, there already exists a legal mechanism in Kenya that okays legislative 
and policy changes in order to incorporate international treaties, agreements and 
conventions that Kenya as a country may subscribe to.  This means that in the event that 
ecological tax reform is adopted as a global environmental policy through the efforts of 
various international environmental institutions, Kenya will be ready to implement it.  
Although, it is important to note that currently, the global environmental policy as spelt in 
Agenda 21 leaves it to individual countries to make their own choices according to their 
national needs.  At individual country level, ecological tax reform as a concept is still 
necessary and can be adapted to the environmental and development needs of each 
nation. 
 
Economic Incentives Mechanism 
Another positive prospect for Kenya as far as the implementation of ecological tax 
reform is concerned is that economic incentives policy upon which environmental 
taxation and ecological tax reform are based is already in place.  Economic incentives 
instruments are clearly spelt out by EMCA and are legally permissible in Kenya.  This 
therefore provides a basis upon which ecological tax reform policy can now be 
formulated for Kenya.  It is even worthwhile to note that Kenya has tried levying 
environmental taxes. Although this was withdrawn in favour of regulatory instruments, it 
remains something to build on. 
 
High Labour Taxes 
Coincidentally, Kenya is levying very high labour taxes.  Labour taxes as we have seen 
create distortions in the economy and may serve to discourage hard work in the case of 
Kenya.  This may in turn lead to a slow down in economic development.  The labour tax 
that exists in the form of income tax therefore requires some reform in order to encourage 
people to work more.  Secondly, labour as a factor of production does not pollute as do 
machinery and equipment.  Taxes that discourage the use of polluting machinery and 
equipment may lead to factor substitution for labour.  Labour is quite abundant in Kenya 
and remains idle most of the time.  Labour substituting technologies would therefore 
create employment and help achieve social objectives like reduction of unemployment, 
crime and other social ills associated with unemployment. Labour is also a reproducible 
hence a sustainable resource compared to productive ventures that cause depletion of 
natural resources like fossil fuel or the ozone layer. Labour intensive technologies would 
therefore help in achieving sustainable development. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL TAX REFORM 
 
Although good prospects for implementation of ecological tax reform exist in Kenya, 
several limitations also attend to it.    These include predominant use of command and 
control, climate change as a global issue, the strive for industrialization and the limited 
prospects of the double dividend concept. 
 
Command and Control Policy 
As Bluffstone (2003) correctly noted, developing countries like Kenya still heavily rely 
on regulatory instruments like command and control.  Examples of command and control 
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include standards and licenses (Barde 2000).  Kenya heavily relies on standards for 
purposes of environmental management.  In this case standards are to be set and enforced 
by the SERC arm of NEMA.  Enforcement involves creation of an environmental 
inspectorate as detailed in Sections 117 and 123.  The inspectorate would be responsible 
for environmental audits and impact studies among other things.  In the year 2004, 
NEMA called upon all going concerns in Kenya to undertake environmental audits.  New 
projects must also be subject to environmental impact studies.  Licenses will be issued 
depending on the outcome of these studies and audits.  The use of this instrument 
involves a high social cost relating to operation of this machinery.    Nevertheless, 
prospects for change are so far. One of the drawbacks we have seen, for example, 
involves the withdrawal of the emissions tax in favour of a regulatory ban. Instead there 
was need to improve on the tax in order to capture the amounts or categories of 
emissions. Although this in itself would involve more administrative and technical 
challenges hence a total ban comes in handy. The weakness of the ban, however, is that it 
does not deter vehicles that are more than eight years old but already in the country from 
polluting the environment. 
 
Global Concerns and National Sacrifice 
The greatest drawback for ecological tax reform in Kenya would be its global objectives 
that alienate it from national concerns.  As noted by Blanke (2002), environmental 
dangers are on the increase but they are more of a global nature hence less tangible.  
Issues of global warming, climate change, ozone layer depletion and so on would not ring 
a bell to many Kenyans.  In fact they will think of them in terms of scientific discussions 
that have no bearing on ordinary citizens.  This therefore means little political support for 
ecological tax reform. 
 
Issues of international equity may also arise.  It is clear which countries are responsible 
for polluting the global environment.  Secondly, Welfens (1999) has regretted the fact 
that 80 percent of the world’s resources are concentrated in industrialized countries with 
only 20 percent of the world’s population.  This 20 percent of the world’s population has 
been sustaining an extravagant lifestyle to the detriment of the rest in developing 
countries.  Why then can it not be left to the industrialized countries to clean up this 
mess?  Further, some of these industrialized countries have remained rogue polluters.  
The US for example, has failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  Concerning ecological tax 
reform, Kerr (2001) has noted that in the US a carbon tax is unlikely to be implemented 
and that where there are carbon taxes in Europe heavy industry is almost invariably 
exempt.  Be that as it may, Welfens (1999:946) has admonished that “a continuation of 
production and consumption patterns as it exists in the industrialized countries, and their 
adoption by the developing countries will lead to the collapse of the earth’s eco-system”.  
This therefore, means that although the mess has been created by the developed world 
other than the developing world, it behoves all countries from across the divide to 
participate in correcting the mess otherwise we all perish.  
 
The Strive for Industrialization 
Developing countries are busy emulating the developed world in the quest for 
industrialization.   Kenya has put its target to be an industrialized country by the year 
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2020. The target is unrealistic but it tells of the raw ambition that fuels the drive to 
industrialization.  With such an ambition anything would count, why care about the 
environment.  History is replete with the social ills of the industrial revolution.  The 
developing world is in an opportune position to learn from the experience of their 
predecessors.  The first lesson would be that the social ills of industrialization have a 
national impact before contributing to the global impact.  Air pollution, for example, will 
first have a local effect before contributing to the global.  Secondly, the national strive for 
industrialization will give industrialists enough ammunition to shoot down proposals for 
ecological tax reform. 
 
Eco-Fiscal Illusion 
Concerning the German case, Blanke (2002) has referred contemptuously to the concept 
of double dividend as “eco-fiscal illusion”.  Although for the German case research has 
been carried out that indicates actual eco-fiscal gains (Bach et al. 2001), in Kenya the 
fiscal gains are even far from imaginable.  This can be stated without fear of 
contradiction to the prospective point made about income taxes in Kenya in the precedent 
section of this review.  In the European setting, labour tax reform would involve relief 
from welfare taxes or social insurance contributions that make labour costs very high.  
The double dividend in this case would also obtain from capital taxes that unfortunately 
are not levied in Kenya.  Given the low industrial base in Kenya, it also means that the 
tax base is so scant it cannot afford a tradeoff with other tax bases like labour.  In Kenya, 




From the review, we have seen that there already exists goodwill of global policy 
convergence in a developing country situation as exemplified by Kenya.  There is a 
mechanism in place for the internalizing of international conventions, treaties and 
agreements.  Secondly, global environmental concerns like ozone layer depletion are 
already internalized and policy instruments exist for national action.  Of particular 
interest is the fact that taxation is already recognized and has been used as one of the 
economic instruments for environmental management.  It is worthwhile though to note 
that its scope is quite limited. 
 
Given this kind of goodwill, ecological tax reform may stand a chance of implementation 
in a developing country situation particularly if it is promoted by international agencies 
as a global environmental policy instrument.  But its usefulness would be greatly 
constrained by among others its historical logic of reliance on the concept of double 
dividend.  This would be so due to the different economic and political circumstances 
obtaining in a developing country situation which include non-welfare oriented labour 
taxes, limited industrial development hence low tax base and the politics of intra-global 
equity.  The conclusion therefore, is that although ecological tax reform would be 
applicable for a developing country like Kenya, it will have to be wrought without the 
double dividend model or within a localized double dividend model.  Going by the 
example of Kenya, we can answer this topical question that: sure developing countries 
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